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The Link Between Trade and Environmental Policy
Geza Feketekuty*
INTRODUCTION
The link between trade and environmental policy has be-
come an issue of growing public interest and debate recently.
Several recent international trade disputes have revolved
around environmental issues and environmental issues have be-
come a major factor in trade negotiations. Trade considerations
have also become an important factor in decisions on environ-
mental policy.
The heightened interest in the link between trade and envi-
ronmental policy goes beyond recent and current conflicts, how-
ever. There are deeper concerns about the adequacy of existing
institutional processes for negotiating international agreements
and for settling international disputes. Environmental organiza-
tions question whether the procedures followed by trade policy
makers in negotiating agreements and settling disputes allow for
proper balancing of environmental and trade policy considera-
tions, and whether the procedures result in the maximum
achievable complementarity between the two sets of policy
goals.1 Trade policy officials, on the other hand, are concerned
that trade policy principles and rules are not given adequate con-
sideration when trade measures are used in two situations: for
the pursuit of national environmental policy objectives and en-
forcement of international environmental agreements. 2 Despite
these concerns by both trade and environmental officials, and
the frictions that have been created in the application of trade
* Chairman of the OECD Trade Committee and Senior Policy Advisor to
the U.S. Trade Representative. The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government or the OECD.
1. A good example of this is the reactions of environmentalists to the
GATT panel report concerning U.S. restrictions on the import of tuna caught
using the purse seine method. See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Environ-
ment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENvTL L. 481-84 (1993). See also
infra note 59 (tuna panel report).
2. For an example of the trade community's concern, see infra notes 41-
43.
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policy and environmental policy, the two sides share some com-
mon long-term goals.
Both trade and environmental policy are aimed at the
achievement of the same long-term goals: improving standards
of living, sustaining the most effective and long-term use of re-
sources, and maximizing opportunities for future growth.3
Trade and environmental officials, however, have different sets
of responsibilities for which they must focus on different aspects
of long-term growth. Trade officials endeavor to achieve a more
efficient allocation of their nation's economic resources by ex-
panding opportunities for international specialization in the pro-
duction of goods and services through trade. They accomplish
this by reducing barriers to trade and negotiating international
ground rules for policy measures that affect trade. Environmen-
tal officials, on the other hand, strive to sustain economic growth
over the long term by preserving and improving environmental
resources. They seek to achieve this objective by establishing
domestic and international ground rules for human activities
that have an adverse impact on the environment.
To achieve the most effective allocation of resources for
long-term economic growth, trade policy and environmental pol-
icy have to be pursued in tandem. Trade policy must take into
account and seek to accommodate environmental policy objec-
tives, and environmental policy must take into account and seek
to accommodate trade policy goals.
Although trade and environmental policy share many com-
mon objectives, differences in concepts and terminology em-
ployed by the two policy communities require the development
of a common framework which will facilitate dialogue over is-
sues of common concern. This framework needs to establish an-
alytical concepts understood and accepted by both policy
communities. It should lead to principles and guidelines that
will help decision makers evaluate overlapping policy objectives
and resolve potential conflicts. Where trade and environmental
3. Among the voluminous writings on environmental policy, the most in-
structive are the drafts for "Agenda 21" for the Rio June 1992 conference and
the 27 "Principles" outlined in the documents for "Agenda Item 9." Agenda 21,
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/4 (Apr. 22, 1992).
For analysis of trade policy and environmental policy, see John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992) [hereinafter Congruence or Conflict, and Pe-
ter L. Lallas et al., Environmental Protection and International Trade: Toward
Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 271 (1992).
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policy goals conflict or require trade-offs, as will happen in some
cases, the two sides must find procedures to minimize the con-
flict and to establish an appropriate balance between trade and
environmental goals.
This Article addresses the concern that current institutional
processes are not yet able to accommodate the overlapping pol-
icy considerations which arise between trade and environmental
policy. It outlines some of the elements of a common framework
both policy communities can use to analyze linkages between
trade and environmental policies, with a view of minimizing con-
flicts and promoting complementarity. 4 As a first step, Part I
provides a primer on the general goals and analytical framework
of the trade community. Part II details the general goals and
analytical framework of the environmental community. Part III
then examines in broad terms how trade and environmental pol-
icies relate to each other, the scope for complementarity and ar-
eas of potential conflict. Part IV examines the relationship
between the goals of trade and environmental policies and how
the two can interact.5 Part V looks at the main areas of conflict
between the two types of measures and in what circumstances
these conflicts are likely to occur. Finally, the Article will out-
line some initial thoughts, on how one might approach the devel-
opment of a common set of principles and guidelines.
I. TRADE POLICY GOALS AND THE UNDERLYING
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The ultimate goal of trade policy is to promote economic
growth and encourage the most efficient use of scarce resources,
including labor, capital and environmental resources. 6 These
objectives are best served by adopting policies that allow trade to
take place on the basis of market-determined prices. In markets
4. The natural synergies between the overriding policy objectives of each
policy community suggest that if there is a better understanding of how each
policy community approaches its objectives, policy officials can work together to
most efficiently achieve the goal of economic development without sacrificing
environmental integrity.
5. Environment policy is not unique in being linked to trade policy. A
broad range of domestic policies affect trade and are in turn affected by trade,
such as agriculture, health, public safety, national security and intellectual
property. In considering the link between trade and environmental policies, it
will be useful to keep in mind how the link between these two policies is similar
to or differs from links between trade policy and other domestic policies.
6. For further exploration of basic trade liberalization policies see JOHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989).
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open to competition, goods are produced and sold by the most
efficient producers, that is, the producers who can most effi-
ciently supply the goods and services that buyers would like to
purchase.7 In other words, the market mechanism permits the
greatest output at the lowest possible cost while using the mini-
mum amount of economic resources.
Notwithstanding the widely recognized benefits of free
trade, in practice most trade is subject to some government in-
tervention. National governments use tariffs, subsidies and reg-
ulatory measures to affect trade in pursuit of a variety of
national objectives. International trade agreements, especially
those negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),8 are designed to limit government intervention
that affects trade in order to preserve trading opportunities.
Although governments are allowed to impose certain types of
trade measures at the border (such as tariffs), under normal con-
ditions these measures must be kept within agreed limits.9 The
objective of these rules is to ensure that the most efficient pro-
ducers in the world have the opportunity to deliver goods and
services to potential buyers on a market-directed basis.
In addition to the commitment to keep trade barriers within
agreed limits, the trade rules incorporated in the General Agree-
ment establish two key principles - the Most Favored Nation
(MFN) principle and the national treatment principle. The
MFN principle is designed to assure that border and internal
measures apply uniformly to suppliers of like products from dif-
ferent exporting countries.10 Under the national treatment
7. This is the basic economic theory generally referred to as "comparative
advantage." The benefits of comparative advantage are derived partly from
economies of scale. When nations specialize, they become more efficient at pro-
ducing a particular product or service. If they then trade those products or
services for goods with countries of a different specialization, all parties will be
better off because resources will have been employed in their most efficient use.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
9. "Normal" conditions are those in which none of the GATT special ex-
ceptions apply. The most common exceptions are the safeguards exception (Id.
Art. XIX, if "unforeseen developments" occur - usually an industry deluged
with imports - a contracting party may suspend a trade concession for a short
period of time to allow a more orderly industry adjustment), the national secur-
ity exception, (Id Art. XXI, used to restrict "sensitive" goods, especially tech-
nology), and the developing country exceptions which cover programs such as
the Generalized System of Preferences.
10. Id. art. I. The only exception is if two or more countries have agreed to
eliminate all barriers between them under a free trade agreement or customs
union. See id. art. XXIV.
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principle, a country must apply domestic laws and regulations
which affect the sale or distribution of products uniformly to
both foreign and domestic producers."
Other GATT principles include methods for binding govern-
ments to specific obligations relating to trade with other coun-
tries.12 For example, past tariff negotiations have resulted in
detailed tariff bindings which commit governments not to
charge customs duties in excess of the bound tariff. Fees on im-
ports are permissible only if they relate directly to services ren-
dered or costs borne.13 Under a second concept, the doctrine of
transparency, members must publish all laws, regulations, judi-
cial decisions and administrative rulings pertaining to imports
and exports.14 This requirement prevents a country from re-
stricting imports based on hidden regulations. Under Article XI,
parties are prohibited from imposing quantitative restrictions on
imports and exports, with limited exceptions.'5 Article XVI cov-
ers the trade-distorting effects of subsidies and is further inter-
preted in the Subsidies Code.' 6 Article VI gives contracting
parties that are adversely affected by the subsidy practices of
others the right to apply countervailing duties to offset the ad-
verse effects.17 Countries may impose countervailing duties to
offset subsidies applied for environmental objectives, if the sub-
sidies create injury.
These principles are designed to prevent measures, that ad-
versely affect the ability of foreign suppliers to compete with do-
mestic suppliers or with each other on the basis of market-
determined prices. If a country believes its exports have been
unfairly treated or an importing country's justification for ex-
cluding the exports does not fit within an enumerated exception,
the exporting country may initiate dispute resolution
procedures.' 8
While GATT rules require governments to limit border
measures under normal circumstances, the rules also spell out
special conditions under which governments can impose such
11. Id. art. III.
12. Id. art. II.
13. Id. art. 11:2.
14. id, art. X.
15. Id. art. XI.
16. Id. art. XVI. For the Subsidies Code, see Agreement on Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, BISD 26th Supp. 56 (1980).
17. GATT, supra note 8, art. VI.
18. Id. art. XXIII.
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measures.19 One of the permitted grounds for establishing
measures at the border to control trade is the achievement of
environmental goals.20 Moreover, as noted above, GATT rules
do not restrict the right of a government to adopt domestic envi-
ronmental measures, though such measures must apply to for-
eign products on a nondiscriminatory basis and must not disrupt
trade more than necessary to achieve the environmental
objective.2 1
II. ENVIRONMENT POLICY GOALS AND THE
UNDERLYING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Understanding the relationship between trade and environ-
mental policies requires an introduction to some key policy goals
and analytical concepts of environmental policy. Making devel-
opment sustainable is a critical goal of environmental policy.22
Economic development cannot be sustained in the long term if
development exhausts scarce natural resources or damages nat-
ural ecosystems essential to the production of goods and serv-
ices. In order to assure that development is sustainable,
producers and consumers need to recognize that environmental
resources are scarce and need to be rationed much as the market
mechanism rations resource inputs that are bought and sold.
Sustainable development also has a human dimension. The
depletion of environmental resources and the degradation of
natural ecosystems reduces the quality of life and creates serious
risks to human health.23 Sustainable development thus requires
each generation to pursue environmental policies that will as-
sure succeeding generations a safe, healthful, productive, and
aesthetic environment.
19. See supra note 9.
20. See GATT, supra, note 8, art. XX. For further discussions of art. XX,
see in fra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
21. GATT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (1992) [hereinafter, GATF
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REPORT].
22. The theory of sustainable development synthesizes resource conserva-
tion and economic growth. Sustainable development proponents aim to "[m]eet
the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their needs." THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND
REPORT]. See also Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Develop-
ment: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. TDBOR, 38th Sess., pt.1, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/1304 (1991); Sustainable Development and UNCTAD Activities, Re-
port by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. TDBOR, 37th Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. TD/
B/1267 (1990).
23. See JAMES LEE, THE ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND HUMAN
ECOLOGY: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 54-87 (1985).
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There is considerable dispute over what constitutes a sus-
tainable use of natural and environmental resources. Some have
argued, on the basis of pessimistic assessments such as that is-
sued by the Club of Rome almost two decades ago, that sustaina-
ble development can only be achieved through substantially
lower or even negative economic growth rates.24 That view does
not adequately account for potential improvements in resource
use and reductions in environmental impact that could accrue
from improved knowledge of environmental issues, better eco-
nomic incentives for more environmentally-friendly resource
use, and further advancements in technology. In any case, un-
less economic growth rates exceed population growth, very little
prospect exists for persuading poor nations to devote resources
for improving the environment, and thus achieving the goal of
sustainable development. That is, people living at a subsistence
level are unlikely to willingly reduce their consumption in order
to preserve the environment. The alternative is a Malthusian
trap where population growth exceeds the capacity of the local
environment to support its human population.
The life-cycle principle, a second key environmental princi-
ple, holds that an evaluation of the environmental effects of an
activity should encompass all of the various stages related to the
production, consumption and disposal of a product.25
A third principle, the precautionary principle, suggests that
environmental policies should err on the side of avoiding even
small risks if great potential environmental harm exists.26
24. See generally DENNIS MEADOWS, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); MIAN-
JLO MESAROVIC & EDUARD PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974).
The Club of Rome grew out of a meeting organized in 1968. Its stated purposes
were to foster understanding of the varied, interdependent components (eco-
nomic, political, natural, and social) that make up the global system in which we
all live; to bring that new understanding to the attention of policy-makers and
the public; and to promote new policy initiatives and action. Id. at 9-12.
25. See, e.g., Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Afterword: Global Trade as a Way to
Integrate Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, 23 Envtl. L.
711, 712 (1992) ("The full cost principle.., includes the environmental damage
of production and consumption in the cost of each product, [and] must be ap-
plied to adequately represent the true cost of the process.").
26. The precautionary principle has also been defined as "lowering the bur-
den of proof required for taking action against proposed or existing activities
that may have serious long-term [effects]." That is, it allows officials to act even
though the scientific evidence is uncertain. Edith Brown Weiss, Symposium:
International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of
a New World Order, 81 Geo. L.J. 675, 690 (1993). See also James Cameron &
Julie Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
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Other principles are designed to assure that environmental
policies are carried out in the most economically efficient man-
ner. It is not always immediately obvious which regulatory ap-
proach constitutes the most economically efficient method of
achieving a desired environmental objective. This is because it is
often difficult to estimate what any particular environmental
regulation will cost, and how such costs compare with potential
environmental benefits. By following the principles described
below, governments can help assure that environmental policy
measures are chosen with a clear understanding of the costs and
benefits of alternative policy choices to society.
One such principle is the Polluter Pays Principle pioneered
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. The polluter pays principle holds that "the price of a good
or service should fully reflect its cost of production and the cost
of the resources used, including environmental resources. '27 In
order to factor the achievement of environmental considerations
efficiently into production decisions, environmental policies
have to develop mechanisms which translate potentially adverse
environmental effects of production activities into costs faced di-
rectly by producers. In the words used by economic theorists,
social costs have to be internalized as costs borne by producers.
Another principle is that governments, whenever possible,
should seek to use economic instruments such as taxes to
achieve environmental goals. A tax, in effect, places a price on
the use of environmental resources. The tax in this context
serves two purposes: (1) it discourages the consumption of goods
or services that create environmental costs; and (2) it encourages
producers to develop and adopt alternative production methods
and products that create fewer environmentally harmful effects.
The government could then use the money collected by the tax
for environmental purposes, such as the improvement of envi-
ronmental resources, construction of better facilities for the
treatment and disposal of environmentally-harmful waste or ex-
pansion of environmentally-friendly habitats such as wetlands
or forests.
Another approach involves the use of tradeable pollution
permits.28 The use of tradeable pollution permits enables the
27. OECD, Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic As-
pects of Environmental Policies, May 26, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972); OECD,
Council Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter Pays Princi-
ple, Nov. 14, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Casey Bukro, Pollution Hedging in the Air, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
[Vol. 2:171
THE LINK BETWEEN TRADE & ENVIRONMENT
government to set an upper limit on certain types of pollution
and to auction off the right to pollute to producers willing the
pay the highest price. The price of such permits will tend to re-
flect the costs incurred by the most efficient producers in adopt-
ing environmentally-friendly production methods. Using these
permits lets the market determine which environmental abate-
ment efforts are the most efficient.
III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
International trade creates a more efficient utilization of
world resources than would be possible without trade. This is
expected to reduce the exploitation of resources, including envi-
ronmental resources, associated with a given level of global out-
put of goods and services. Alternatively, trade can be seen as
increasing the global output of goods and services without a cor-
responding increase in the exploitation of environmental
resources.
Contrary to the mythology created by the growth pessimism
of the Club of Rome,29 such an increase in global economic out-
put has a positive benefit for the environment. Experience has
shown that the higher the per capita income of a country, the
higher its environmental consciousness, and the more it is will-
ing and able to commit resources to improving the environ-
ment.30 In fact, in a country in which the majority of the
population is barely able to sustain life, the government is un-
likely to divert resources to an improvement of environmental
quality, even if that decision clearly threatens to harm future
generations. Positive per capita growth rates in the output of
goods and services are therefore essential for achieving sustaina-
ble development.31 To the extent international trade increases
economic growth rates and helps lift the population of a country
above the subsistence level, international trade will support the
achievement of environmental goals.
Sound environmental policies are equally important for
long-term growth. Without the natural wealth contained in en-
29, 1993, § C, at 1; Michael Parrish, Auction of Pollution Rights Called a Success,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, § D, at 1.
29. See supra note 24.
30. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Environ-
ment: The North American Free Trade Agreement 3 (1992) (available from the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).
31. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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vironmental resources such as clean water, clean air, a protec-
tive atmosphere, and a healthy ecosystem, it will not be possible
to sustain a continued expansion in the output of goods and serv-
ices. In this sense, environmental policy, like trade policy, can
help assure long-term economic growth and help assure that
economic prosperity today is not at the expense of economic
prosperity and well being tomorrow.
Sound environmental policies can also help maximize the
environmental benefits from international trade. If environ-
mental policies succeed in placing an accurate value on true re-
source costs, including the environmental resource costs
associated with production, such policies will help assure that
trade results in the least environmental degradation at any level
of global output.3 2
To put this relationship into language used by economic the-
orists, if a government elects to treat the degradation of the en-
vironment resulting from domestic economic activity as a
resource cost to society, and if government policy measures suc-
ceed in placing equivalent monetary costs on producers through
taxes or tradeable permits, then international trade will lead to
the least degradation given the valuation put on environmental
resources by the individual national and local governments. 33
Similarly, if government policy measures limit the allowable
pollution through regulation, then international trade will maxi-
mize global output at the level of environmental quality embod-
ied in the regulations.
An example can help to illustrate the above theoretical
points. Assume country A can produce certain agricultural
products more cheaply than country B because its farming
methods are more mechanized, and a reduction in trade barriers
would lead to increased exports of such products from country A
to country B. The south region of country A has better climatic
conditions than the north region for growing the crops in ques-
tion, but the south region tends to use more water because the
warmer weather evaporates water more quickly. Water use in
the south region is more expensive because it is less abundant
32. One problem with this theory is assessing the true resource costs. For
example, it is more costly to have a degrading effect on the environment in a
region that has been only minimally spoiled by industrialization, such as a coun-
try in the Amazon Basin.
33. The valuation of environmental resources is not an exact science. It
depends in part on how much value the population of a country or any of its
subdivisions wish to place on clean air and water, access to natural habitats, and
other "environmental variables."
[Vol. 2:171
THE LINK BETWEEN TRADE & ENVIRONMENT
and larger populations and industries create greater demands
for alternative uses of water. Moreover, water use has an envi-
ronmental cost in the south because it deprives certain water-
dependant habitats of water, while water is so abundant in the
north region that its use has no environmental impact. If farm-
ers are not charged for water, expanded trade leads to increased
production in the south region, which is economically less effi-
cient and environmentally more damaging than would be an ex-
pansion of production in the north region. If the farmers are
charged the full social cost of water, increased trade leads to ex-
panded production in the north region rather than the south re-
gion, which is both economically more efficient and
environmentally more sound.s4
If social costs associated with resource use, including envi-
ronmental costs, are not accurately factored into internationally
traded goods, trade can - in some circumstances - increase the
level of global environmental degradation. Nevertheless, any in-
dividual country engaged in trade can generally shield itself
from potential degradation of the local environment by enforc-
ing appropriate environmental measures within its own
territory.
A country is not always able to shield itself from the poten-
tially adverse impact of increased trade on the global ecosystem.
For example, assume that country A can produce manufactured
products more cheaply because it has lower wages, but the pro-
duction process releases twice as many Chlorofluoro Carbons
(CFCs) into the atmosphere. This production method is very
damaging to the global ozone layer, which protects the earth
from ultra-violet radiation. A reduction of trade barriers will
34. The valuation of environmental resources reflects the social prefer-
ences of a particular society. These social preferences are embodied in environ-
mental measures taken by individual governments at a national or local level,
or environmental agreements negotiated among such governments. The analy-
sis of socially optimal outcomes with respect to environmental policy issues can-
not be divorced from the political process used to determine how much a society
is prepared to pay to achieve desired environmental goals. Disagreements
among countries over actions that affect the global commons are particularly
difficult because they usually involve differences with respect to desired out-
comes for shared environmental resources as well as differences over how
much each country is prepared to pay to achieve shared benefits. The use of
trade measures to compel other countries to change their environmental meas-
ures could be resented for three reasons: because it would violate the country's
sovereignty, because it would reduce national income and the competitiveness
of national products in global competition, and because it might shift the cost of
achieving desired outcomes in global environmental resources from the import-
ing country to the exporting country.
1993]
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lead to an expansion of production in country A and a decrease
in production in country B, and this will increase the level of
CFCs in the atmosphere, accelerating the destruction of the
ozone layer. Similar concerns persuaded the drafters of the
Montreal Protocol on the emission of CFCs to include enforce-
ment provisions which ban imports of CFCs from countries that
have not signed the convention.35 Not surprisingly, issues con-
cerning cross-border pollution and the global commons have
been sources of particular friction between trade and environ-
mental objectives.
Policies which require producers to fully account for the use
of environmental resources can produce the collateral benefit of
spurring industry to develop new production methods that make
more efficient use of resource inputs and reduce long-run pro-
duction costs. As new processes are developed, trade can pro-
vide the means for the rapid international diffusion of
environmentally-friendly technologies. 36 Moreover, an open
trading system encourages the establishment of open and demo-
cratic political attitudes, which will tend to make a government
more accountable and thus more friendly to the environment. 37
Without the natural wealth contained in such environmen-
tal resources as clean water, clean air, a protective atmosphere
and a healthy ecosystem, sustaining a continued expansion of
economic activity will be impossible. In this sense, environmen-
tal policy, like trade policy, can help assure long-term economic
growth and help assure that current economic prosperity does
not undermine future economic prosperity and well being.
Generally, trade and environmental policy goals can be rec-
onciled most effectively when trade and environmental policies
are both designed to most efficiently achieve their respective
objectives. The greatest potential for conflicts exists where defi-
ciencies in trade or environmental policies lead to suboptimal
decisions with respect to either policy goal. This is likely to be
the case for both economic and political reasons.
The basic economic reason for a virtuous relationship be-
35. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol]. For the 1990 London Amendments, see Report of the Second Meeting
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. EP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (1990).
36. See generally Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology, Cooper-
ation and Capacity-Building, UNCED Agenda 21, Ch. 34 (Apr. 22, 1992).
37. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, 1 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 21 (1992).
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tween trade and environmental policy is that more efficient en-
vironmental policies will lead to more efficient trade policies
and vice versa.-s As mentioned above, environmental policies
that force producers and consumers to take account of environ-
mental costs will also help assure that trade results in the most
efficient long-term global allocation of resources, including envi-
ronmental resources. At the same time, trade policies that are
designed to achieve the most efficient global allocation of re-
sources will help assure the most efficient use of global environ-
mental resources, including environmental resources protected
by environmental policies.
A good example of the interrelationship of trade, environ-
mental, and other domestic policies can be found in the area of
agriculture. Protectionist policies combined with high price sup-
ports and inadequate environmental regulations concerning the
use of fertilizers and pesticides have led in many countries to the
wasteful overproduction of agricultural goods; excessive use of
fertilizers, pesticides, and marginal land subject to erosion; and
high prices for consumers. Liberalization of trade, along with a
shift from price supports to income supports, would lead to elim-
ination of agricultural surpluses, lower prices for consumers,
less use of environmentally harmful fertilizers and pesticides,
and lower cultivation of marginal land.
While the lower prices resulting from trade liberalization
would reduce incentives to use high cost inputs such as fertiliz-
ers and persticides, it would not, by itself, assure the environ-
mentally sound use of fertilizers, pesticides and land subject to
erosion. This would require appropriate environmental policies.
The adoption of such policies would help assure the most effi-
cient and least environmentally damaging allocation of land re-
sources for the production of global food needs.
Governments can achieve an even better outcome where di-
rect income support to farmers is tied to environmentally sound
practices, such as the retirement of land subject to erosion, the
conversion of marginal land to forests, or the growing of envi-
38. The report of the United Nations World Commission on the Environ-
ment (the "Brundtland Commission") illustrates that long-term environmental
protection is an integral requirement of sustainable economic development pol-
icy, and that environmentally sound economic development, supported by open
trade, is essential for long-term environmental protection. BRUNDTLAND RE-
PORT, supra note 22, at 1-23. For an example, see Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues (Feb. 1992)
(interagency task force) (on file with author) [hereinafter Review of U.S.-Mex-
ico Environmental Issues].
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ronmentally beneficial crops. The implementation of such poli-
cies in connection with the liberalization of agricultural trade
barriers can create a strong complementarity between trade and
environmental policy objectives.
To cite another example, environmental policy measures
based on product design rather than on performance standards
are likely to be less efficient in achieving the environmental ob-
jective as well as more trade distorting; here suboptimal results
occur with respect to both trade policy and environmental policy
goals. The use of design standards in place of performance stan-
dards precludes the market from operating as intended, thus sti-
fling the innovative search for the most efficient design to
accomplish the desired environmental objective. In addition, a
uniform product design may not perform the same under all
conditions, thus undermining the very goal for which the design
standard was adopted.39
Politically, foreign exporters of manufactured goods who
are adversely affected by an environmental decision will be
more willing to accept such a decision if it efficiently contributes
to the achievement of a legitimate environmental goal. This is
not the case where the environmental measure is not the most
effective means to achieve an environmental goal, or if the envi-
ronmental goal lacks the legitimacy of scientific evidence and
broad public support. Two tests apply to these measures: First,
the cost of such a restriction must justify the resulting benefit.
Second, the restriction must not be a disguised barrier to trade.
Similarly, environmentalists are more likely to accept limi-
tations placed on the use of trade measures for environmental
reasons if trade is based on economic factors such as differences
in resource prices than if it is the result of government policies
that artificially reduce the prices paid by producers for resource
inputs, particularly if such subsidies encourage the wasteful use
of such resources or encourage environmentally damaging pro-
duction methods.
For example, in the agricultural trade example cited above,
environmentalists are much less likely to support liberalization
of agricultural trade if such trade is largely the result of govern-
ment subsidies that encourage the heavy use of fertilizers and
the farming of marginal land. They would more likely support
the measure if such trade largely reflects differences in the nat-
39. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. This is one benefit of the
GATT Standards Code which prohibits disguised barriers to trade. See infra
Part V.B.
[Vol. 2:171
THE LINK BETWEEN TRADE & ENVIRONMENT
ural fertility of the soil and in climatic conditions. Environmen-
talists will realize that in the latter case, trade will reduce the
environmental degradation of the land, while in the former case
it could well increase the environmental degradation of the land.
To put these issues another way, less efficient means of
achieving stated policy objectives is likely to create increased
conflicts by reducing the legitimacy of such policy measures in
the eye of affected interest groups, thus reducing their willing-
ness to accept necessary sacrifices. At the same time, less effi-
cient means of achieving stated policy goals will often increase
both the tradeoffs required and the conflicts generated by an
overlap of trade and environmental goals.
To summarize, complementarity between trade and envi-
ronmental goals can best be achieved if the prices at which goods
and services are exported and imported incorporate any social
costs associated with degradation of the environment. This will
be the case if external environmental costs are internalized,
either through the taxation of pollution and other negative envi-
ronmental effects, the use of tradeable pollution permits or simi-
lar regulatory mechanisms.
Environmental standards do not have to be the same in all
countries to achieve desirable environmental goals. Differences
in the habitat and the geographic dispersion of pollutants lead to
different environmental effects. Moreover, social decisions re-
garding the acceptable level of environmental quality or the ac-
ceptable level of risk from environmental damage vary from
country to country. Differences in economic development, in
particular, affect the value put on environmental resources and
the avoidance of environmental risks.40 Differences in the social
values put on environmental resources and the avoidance of en-
vironmental risks create potential conflicts among nations be-
cause many environmental resources cannot be hermetically
sealed within national borders. Examples include migratory
species, the atmosphere, and the oceans. Transfrontier environ-
mental issues pose a number of difficult questions as to who
should bear the responsibility for the problem.41
Some of the most difficult conflicts between trade policy
40. Ingo Walter, International Economic Repercussions of Environmental
Policy: An Economist's Perspective, in ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELA.
TION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoLicY 22, 23 (Seymour
J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1982).
41. The OECD has recommended that a number of principles be followed
to solve transborder pollution problems, including international cooperation,
harmonization of standards, and actions other than the use of trade sanctions.
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and environmental policy are likely to be caused by interna-
tional disagreements over who should decide environmental
standards, and at what level of government they should be de-
cided. Each country wants to defend its sovereignty in making
environmental decisions, while at the same time seeking to in-
fluence environmental decisions by other countries.42 Achieving
an international consensus on who should decide which environ-
mental issues is therefore likely to be important in avoiding con-
flict between trade and environmental policies.
Incompatible national systems for accomplishing environ-
mental objectives can cause conflicts between trade and environ-
mental policy officials. In this light, it would be useful to
examine the desirability of and conditions for greater interna-
tional compatibility of environmental policies, testing proce-
dures and standards, taking due account of legitimate
differences in approaches to risk management and the situations
prevailing in individual countries.
IV. MAJOR AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT
BETWEEN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MEASURES
The long-term objectives of trade and environmental poli-
cies can be made complementary and mutually reinforcing
through the right policies; however, frictions between trade and
environmental policies are inevitable in the short term. Even
under the most rational and efficient trade and environmental
policies, there are circumstances under which trade and environ-
mental policy measures will conflict.
In a global economy, effective national environmental poli-
cies may sometimes require the use of trade policy instru-
ments.43  For example, protecting humans, animals and
ecosystems from harmful pesticides requires not only a ban on
OECD, Council Recommendation on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pol-
lution, Nov. 14, 1974, 14 I.L.M. 242 (1975).
42. The United Nations has condemned the use of trade measures as a
means of economic coercion to influence the sovereign decisions of other na-
tions. Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion
Against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(b), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/44/510 (1989).
43. The U.S. International Trade Commission's recent review of trade and
environmental policy instruments identified 19 international environmental
conventions authorizing signatories to take restrictive trade measures. U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRON-
MENT AND WILDLIFE 5-1 TO 5-2, USITC PUB. 2351 (1991).
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domestically produced pesticides that fail to meet environmental
standards, but also a ban on imported pesticides that fail to meet
the same or equivalent standard. It may even require a ban on
imports of products containing residues of banned pesticides.
Resource conservation may in some cases require regulating do-
mestic sales and restricting exports.
International environmental agreements designed to en-
hance the global environment may need to include the use of
trade measures to limit nonconforming imports, both to enforce
the agreement among members and to prevent free riders."
One example is the Montreal Protocol which seeks to eliminate
the use of chemicals destructive of the ozone layer.45
The restrictive impact of trade measures on the imported
goods in these types of cases can lead to frictions with the for-
eign producers concerned and their trade officials. The sources
of potential conflict between trade and environmental policy
measures are organized into five categories that highlight key
areas of policy concern. Each category raises slightly different
trade policy issues, each of which may require different treat-
ment under future trade rules.
Category 1: Impact of Environmental Measures on the In-
ternational Competitiveness of Domestic Producers
The adoption of new environmental regulations by individ-
ual countries could lead to a loss of international competitive-
ness by some national producers if the costs of implementing the
new regulations are large and if major competitors in other
countries are not required to adopt similar environmental stan-
dards. The resulting loss of competitiveness can lead to domes-
tic political pressure for lower national environmental
standards, or for higher tariffs or domestic subsidies to offset the
potential loss of competitiveness vis ' vis regional competitors.46
Concerns about the impact of new environmental measures on
competitiveness are likely to be reinforced if some governments
taking environmental measures require their producers to ab-
44. Free riders in this case are non-signatory countries that may not only
reap the benefits of the agreement without contributing to it, but may even
undermine it by expanding their own use of the controlled substance.
45. Montreal Protocol, supra note 34. For an explanation of the relation-
ship between the Montreal Protocol and GATT, see Geoffrey W. Levin, Note,
The Environment and Trade, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 262-65 (1992).
46. In the United States there has been a steady call for protective legisla-
tion that would link access to U.S. markets with environmental protection.
Much of the proposed legislation would have the intended effect of protecting
domestic producers against foreign producers who face lesser environmental
protection costs in their own countries. See generally id.
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sorb the full cost of the new environmental measures, while
other governments absorb some or all of the cost through gov-
ernment subsidies to industry.47
Fears about the competitiveness impact of new environmen-
tal regulations could create a potential tradeoff between higher
levels of import protection and lower environmental standards.
In this kind of situation, those concerned about the environment
might well argue for higher levels of protection, while those con-
cerned about import barriers might argue for lower environ-
mental standards. 48
In practice, there is little documented evidence that envi-
ronmental policies have had a major adverse impact on interna-
tional industrial competitiveness. Existing estimates of the cost
of environmental controls in the United States suggest that such
costs have run on the order of only 2 to 2 1/2 per cent of total
costs in pollution intensive industries.49 Moreover, empirical
studies have shown that in key industries facing added invest-
ment in more environmentally-friendly production equipment,
all the major producers face stricter environmental standards;
economies of scale tend to dictate that most new equipment
which producers offered for sale in international markets incor-
porate such technology.5° Moreover, in some cases strict envi-
47. The Polluter Pays Principle addresses this issue. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
48. The GAT Secretariat identified three approaches to decreasing the
disproportionate effects of differing environmental standards: raising the stan-
dards in countries with low standards to a harmonized level; imposing duties on
foreign imports to offset the claimed unfair cost advantage; and providing do-
mestic subsidies. Trade and the Environment, supra note 21, at 17.
49. Review of U.S.-Mexico Environment Issues, supra note 38, at 165;
Manufactures Pollution Abatement Capital Expenditure & Operating Costs,
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Report # MA200 (88)-i
(1988). A third report classified 86% of the 445 industries surveyed in the Stan-
dard Industrial Classifications have environmental costs which are less than 2%
of the value added. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Survey of
Manufactures 1989 - Statistics of Industrial Groups and Industries, M 89 (A-S)
-1.
50. In other words, industrialized countries with higher environmental
standards require producers to purchase environmentally-friendly equipment.
The equipment manufacturers, in order to achieve economies of scale, produce
only the environmentally-friendly equipment, and thus all major goods produ-
cers, whether in a developed or developing country, which invest in new equip-
ment are required to buy the safer equipment.
The steel industry provides a good example. As environmental standards
in the major industrialized countries converge, steel producers are forced to
purchase equipment which limits pollution. See Competitive Conditions in the
Steel Industry and Industry Efforts to Adjust 'and Modernize, USITC Pub. 2436,
3-33 Inv. No. 332-289 (Sept. 1991) (report to the President).
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ronmental standards can exert a positive effect on
competitiveness. Such standards can spur industries to develop
new technologies and processes that are more efficient, reduce
the cost of materials, reduce costs for disposing wastes,5' and
create new commercial opportunities in environmental goods
and services.
Despite the empirical evidence to date on the limited com-
petitive impact of environmental regulations, public concern
about the potential loss of competitiveness remains an important
factor in the political debate over environmental issues. This
concern suggests the need for improved analysis and wider dis-
semination of such analysis.
The Polluter Pays Principle can help to defuse potential
conflicts between trade and environmental goals by removing an
important concern about the differential impact of environmen-
tal policies on competitiveness. If all governments require pol-
luting industries to bear the cost of pollution abatement efforts,
then one issue is removed. Moreover, whenever all major ex-
porting countries internalize the social cost of pollution as called
for by the polluter pays principle, all the remaining adverse
trade effects are minimized; the trade effects that remain are
welfare enhancing because they improve the allocation of
resources.
Category 2: Application of Domestic Environmental Meas-
ures to Internationally Traded Products
Sub Category (a): Imposing Domestic Environmental Meas-
ures on Imports
In order to accomplish domestic environmental objectives,
national governments must be able to enforce standards regard-
ing the use or disposal of products with harmful environmental
effects, whether such products are locally manufactured or im-
ported. A conflict between trade and environmental policies can
arise if foreign exporters believe that environmental regulations
imposed on imports are more restrictive or costly than those im-
posed on equivalent domestic goods and services, or if the regu-
lations are more costly or restrictive than necessary to achieve
the stated goal. A conflict may also arise if foreign exporters
believe that the stated environmental objective is not supported
by scientific evidence.
51. For example, a recent report on the U.S. steel industry estimated aver-
age environmental control measures at 0.3% of total sales. Competitive Condi-
tions in the Steel Industry and Industry Efforts to Adjust and Modernize,
USITC Pub. 2316, 28 Inv. No. 332-289. (Sept. 1990) (report to the President).
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Existing international trade rules and amendments to those
rules being negotiated in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations provide some ground rules for sorting out
such conflicts. The rules generally accept the application of do-
mestic standards, including environmental standards, to imports
provided: (a) the standard is applied in a nondiscriminatory
fashion on imports and on equivalent domestically produced
goods (the national treatment principle); and (b) any mandatory
standards imposed on imports do not create unnecessary obsta-
cles to trade.52
These rules allow each national government to establish its
own levels of environmental quality and to adopt its own regula-
tory approach to the achievement of legitimate environmental
goals.53
Of course, it should not be surprising that eminently reason-
able and rational people can disagree over issues such as what is
a legitimate environmental goal, what is an unnecessary obstacle
to trade, and what is a necessary degree of discrimination in or-
der to achieve desired environmental goals. Where differences
over these issues arise, consultations between trade officials and
environment officials on the basis of established principles and
rules can result in mutually satisfactory outcomes.54
Environmental advocates have expressed a number of con-
cerns with respect to these existing trade rules. For example,
they have questioned whether trade officials charged with decid-
ing whether a less trade restrictive measure would achieve the
same environmental result are qualified to make such judg-
ments. They have also questioned whether the existing trade
rules make it clear enough that the burden is on trade officials
to show that alternative measures would accomplish the same
environmental goal, rather than placing a burden on environ-
mental officials to prove that a particular measure is the least
trade restrictive.
It is fair to ask, however, whether the guidance provided by
52. See, e.g., The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards
Code) BISD 26th Supp. 8 (1980), (entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter
Standards Code]; Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade: Report of the
Committee Presented to the CONTRACTING PARTIES at Their Forty-sixth Ses-
sion, reprinted in BISD 37th Supp. 317 (1991); Trade Agreements Implementa-
tion Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (U.S. implementation of
the Tokyo Round).
53. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
54. An example of such standards and rules are the Tokyo Round codes
and the Standards code; see infra text accompanying notes 76-87.
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existing internationally agreed principles and rules is adequate
for the task at hand. In particular, do these rules adequately
factor in the much larger demands being placed on environmen-
tal policies today, as compared to when the GATT was written?
The most likely answer to this is probably not. Existing princi-
ples under which consultations are held and disputes are settled
may require more transparency and more explicit provisions for
inputs by environmental experts.
Sub Category (b): Imposing Domestic Environmental Stan-
dards on Exports
In accordance with the principle of sovereignty, each coun-
try should determine what standards to apply within its borders
to protect its citizens and environment. Consistent with this
principle, countries have a right to impose national environmen-
tal regulation on imports when the use or disposal of imports
will damage the national environment. Likewise, a country
need not regulate the export of goods or services whose use or
disposal abroad is expected to harm the citizens or environment
of the foreign importing country. Presumably the governments
of such countries can take whatever measures they deem neces-
sary to prevent such harm.
A contentious issue has arisen, however, with respect to the
export of environmentally damaging goods and services to coun-
tries that lack the technical and financial resources to develop
and enforce appropriate environmental standards. There has
been an attempt over the years to shift at least some portion of
the responsibility for the surveillance and control of potentially
hazardous goods from importing countries that lack the neces-
sary knowledge and skills to exporting countries that have the
knowledge and skills.55 Beyond these practical considerations,
some have argued that countries have a moral obligation to regu-
late the export of products they know to be harmful to the
environment.
There is a question, however, whether the desired environ-
mental objective would be achieved if the ban on a hazardous
substance were not imposed by an importing country on all po-
tential suppliers, including local and third-country producers.
55. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, UNEP Doc.
IG.80/3, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) (creating international treaty to place responsibil-
ity for protecting against health and environmental risks of transboundary
movement of hazardous waste) (in force as of May 5, 1992 for twenty countries
not including the United States).
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In the absence of a comprehensive ban by the importing country,
an exporting country imposing an export ban could lose poten-
tial sales without any corresponding environmental gain in the
importing country.
There is also the question as to who should most appropri-
ately assess the risk associated with the use of banned products.
The acceptable level of risk may differ from country to country,
as may the trade-off between risk avoidance and other
objectives.
There has been much wider acceptance of the idea that
countries that ban or restrict the local use of a product or sub-
stance should share the information leading to the ban with
other countries. Such a consensus has lead to the establishment
of the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals
(IRPTC) in Geneva, a central information clearinghouse on haz-
ardous substances. 56 Countries have agreed to disclose their do-
mestic regulatory actions, the reasons for the actions, and the
likelihood that exports will occur, and importing countries are
then informed so that they can choose whether to take action on
their own. Any regulation by importing countries, in accordance
with GATT requirements, would have to apply equally to im-
ports from all sources and to any domestic production of the
chemical in question.5 7
Notwithstanding the issues raised above, it would be quite
reasonable for an individual country to decide on its own to ban
the export of domestically prohibited goods for environmental
reasons. Such an action can help provide the necessary moral
leadership to a broader, global ban on a hazardous product, par-
ticularly a product that is likely to endanger not only the local
environment but also the broader global environment.
Category 3: Impact of Trade Measures on Environment
Policy
Trade measures affect where and in what quantities goods
will be produced globally. The production of such goods, how-
ever, is subject to each country's environmental regulations. In-
ternational trade rules recognize the right of each government
56. UNEP/G.C. 85(V) (1977). The IRPTC was set up in 1972 at the UN
Conference on the Human Environment. "The purpose of the IRPTC is to com-
pile data, profiles for chemical production, use, environmental pathways, toxic-
ity, and treatment of chemical poisoning, and to provide a survey of control
actions which have been taken in the manufacturing country on potentially
toxic compounds." GUNTHER HANDL & ROBERT E. LuTz, TRANSFERRING HAZ-
ARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES 68 n.20 (1985).
57. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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to establish its own environmental goals and to develop its own
environmental measures, provided they do not create unneces-
sary barriers to trade. An environmental measure is deemed to
create an unnecessary barrier to trade if it can be shown that the
same environmental goal could be achieved through alternative
measures that would have a less restrictive effect on trade.
Environmental advocates have expressed concern that lib-
eralizing trade with countries that have lower environmental
standards or less disciplined enforcement policies would in-
crease global pollution. This conclusion does not necessarily fol-
low, because the capacity of different national ecosystems to
absorb pollutants can vary significantly. Moreover, global pollu-
tion has to be measured in reference to the desired level of envi-
ronmental quality in each country, which can vary significantly,
depending on the standard of living in individual countries and
other factors.60 It leads to a key question as to who should have
the right to decide on environmental standards. The importing
country? The exporting country? The world community? Cur-
rent trade rules leave that decision exclusively to the importing
country.59 The question is whether that rule makes sense where
pollution in one country adversely affects the environment in
neighboring countries or the global environment.
Category 4: Use of Trade Measures to Enforce Environmen-
tal Agreements
Trade measures have been adopted in international environ-
mental agreements as enforcement mechanisms. Examples are
agreements that have been negotiated with respect to endan-
gered species (CITES),60 hazardous wastes (Basel Convention),6 '
and chemicals such as CFCs which destroy the ozone layer
(Montreal Protocol).62 Trade measures in such agreements are
58. Other factors include the ability of the local climate to dissipate or
break down pollution. For example, air pollution over Los Angeles becomes
trapped in the lower atmosphere causing health hazards while in other loca-
tions, the wind disperses air pollution rapidly. Another example is the ecologi-
cal sensitivity of wetlands.
59. A recent GATT Panel has argued that measures protecting life and
health should be limited to the regulating country's territory, thus prohibiting
extraterritorial environmental protection through trade restrictions. United
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 IL.M. 1594 (Sept. 1991) (GATT
panel report, not yet adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Panel Report].
60. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into
force July 1, 1975) (restricting trade in species included in its three appendices)
[hereinafter CITES].
61. Basel Convention, supra note 55.
62. Montreal Protocol, supra note 35.
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designed to enforce the provisions of the agreement among sig-
natories. Trade measures are also sometimes used to impose the
provisions of the agreement on imports from countries that have
not signed the agreement,63 partly to prevent the relocation of
environmentally-damaging practices to non-signatory countries,
partly to prevent non-signatories from deriving economic bene-
fits from their non-participation, and partly to solve the free-
rider problem, whereby non-signatories would obtain the envi-
ronmental benefits of the agreement without contributing to it.
The use of trade measures to enforce environmental agree-
ments among signatory countries creates no conflict with trade
rules. Questions could arise, however, with respect to the proper
forum for the resolution of disputes over the application of sanc-
tions in particular cases.
In contrast, the use of trade measures to enforce interna-
tional environmental agreements against non-signatories is not
explicitly permitted by current GATT rules. The recent Tuna
panel argued that the GATT rules prohibit any extraterritorial
application of domestic environmental policies. 64 Some have ar-
gued, however, that GATT article XX(g) was not originally lim-
ited to domestic measures but validated trade restrictions
implemented to protect the environment in the global com-
mons.65 In any case, non-signatory countries that have been po-
tentially affected by such provisions, such as the Montreal
Protocol, have been reluctant to challenge their application to
date. There is wide agreement that the rules in this area will
need to be clarified, whether by interpretation, amendment, or
some other type of decision by GATT member countries.66
Category 5: Use of Trade Measures as Sanctions and as En-
vironmental Bargaining Tools
63. Article four of the Montreal Protocol states that, "Within one year of
the entry into force of this Protocol, each Party shall ban the import of con-
trolled substances from any State not party to this Protocol." Id. at 1554.
64. Tuna Panel Report, supra note 59.
65. See, e.g., Robert Repetto, Trade and Environmental Policy: Achieving
Complementarity and Avoiding Conflicts, 22-25 (forthcoming, World Resources
Institute 1993) (manuscript on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade).
66. Until an appropriate amendment or treaty exception to the current
regulatory scheme is adopted, multilateral agreements may avoid challenge by
using the GATT waiver to clarify issues in respect of those treaties. A waiver
requires a two-thirds approval by a quorum of at least half of all GATT mem-
bers. See GATT art. XXV. Professor Jackson advocates this view, arguing that
because most signatories to important environmental agreements will likely be
GATT members, achieving a two-thirds vote out of 105 members should not be
overly difficult. See Congruence or Conflict, supra note 3, at 1244-45.
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In some situations individual countries have used trade
measures to impose environmental standards on the production
of goods in another country without the moral and legal sanc-
tions of an international agreement.6 7 This action might be mo-
tivated by a desire to assure that environmental regulations
imposed on domestic producers to improve the global environ-
ment are not undermined by increased imports. Alternatively,
such measures might simply be motivated by a moral conviction
that it is appropriate to use the country's leverage as an importer
to force foreign producers to adopt more environmentally-
friendly production methods.
As already noted, current trade rules do not explicitly per-
mit the use of trade measures to impose environmental stan-
dards on production processes that take place outside a country's
own territory. The use of trade measures in these kind of situa-
tions has been condemned by some as unilateralism. Moreover,
GATT dispute settlement panels have found that the use of
trade measures in such cases violated GATT rules.68
At the same time, many environmental advocates argue that
a country should have the right to use its consumer power to
improve the global environment. Moreover, they would argue
that any country's ability to make an effective contribution to
the solution of a global environmental problem would be under-
mined if it could not impose the same standards on the produc-
tion of both domestically produced goods and imported goods,
particularly where implementation of the standard is costly and
could make the domestic product uncompetitive. Where domes-
tic efforts are aimed at the preservation of migratory species or
oceanic marine species, the use of import restraints may be the
only tool available to a government to achieve effective environ-
mental action.69
In this, as in the other areas, procedures and principles need
to be developed that will permit governments to achieve both
environmental and trade policy goals. Preservation of the
earth's living resources is clearly an important objective, and
achievement of this objective may require trade measures to as-
sure that the conservation efforts of one country are not offset
by the lack of such measures in other countries. At the same
67. Levin, supra note 45, at 256-62.
68. See supra note 59.
69. See, e.g., the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) Pub. L. No.
92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972) (as amended, notably by Pub. L. No. 100-711, 102
Stat. 4755 (1988) (codified in part at 16 U.S.C. § 1361ff)).
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time, the preservation of a rule-based trading system requires
that import restrictions be allowed only under carefully defined
circumstances. Without such disciplines, international trade
could collapse as each country imposed protectionist measures
disguised as environmental measures.
V. GATT PROVISIONS RELATED TO MEASURES
APPLIED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES
As summarized above, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) spells out the rules governing international
trade. Over 100 countries now subscribe to GATT rules. These
member countries must observe GATT rules whenever they im-
plement any measures affecting trade, including environmental
measures.
Countries are generally obligated not to impose any trade
barriers inconsistent with the commitments on tariff bindings or
the prohibition on quotas. The GATT provides, however, for
specific exceptions from these limits on the use of border restric-
tions, national treatment violations, and from other GATT obli-
gations. The most important exceptions for environmental
purposes are those embodied in GATT Article XX.70
A. ARTICLE XX
Article XX of the GATT provides explicit exceptions from
GATT obligations with respect to environmental concerns. A
country must abide by the obligations in the general agreement
so long as the observance of these obligations does not "prevent
the adoption or enforcement" of an objective enumerated under
Article XX,71 including environmental objectives listed under
items (b) and (g).
The preamble of Article XX establishes two threshold tests
for whether any of its enumerated exceptions apply. First,
measures cannot be "a disguised restriction on international
trade." Second, measures cannot be applied in a manner that
would "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation between countries where the same conditions prevail. '72
Once the threshold tests are met, an environmental regula-
tion must fit squarely into either subparagraph (b) or (g). Sub-
70. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX.; for examples of some of the other, non-
environmental exceptions, see supra note 9.
71. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX, pmbl.
72. Id
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paragraph (b) states that measures must be "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health." A dispute panel
has interpreted "necessary" to mean the least GATT-inconsis-
tent alternative.73
Subparagraph (g) encompasses measures that "relate to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources." The 1988 case
on Canadian herring and salmon defined "related to" to mean
"primarily aimed at" the conservation of such resources.74 Ac-
tion taken under subparagraph (g) must be "made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption. '75
B. THE STANDARDS CODE
In addition to the provisions of the General Agreement, the
Tokyo Round negotiations resulted in nine major international
agreements on nontariff measures.76 The most important ex-
isting code for environmental purposes is the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, known as the "Standards Code.' 77
The Standards Code acts as a check on government regulations,
ensuring that governments do not create unnecessary obstacles
to international trade when they adopt technical regulations or
standards for reasons of safety, health, consumer or environ-
mental protection, or other purposes. There are now forty sig-
natories to the code.
Key features of the Standards Code are:
* National and regional certification systems must grant to for-
eign suppliers access equal to that granted domestic suppliers.
Certifications systems must be applied on a most-favored-na-
73. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Ciga-
rettes, BISD 37th Supp. 200, 223 (1990) (GATT panel report adopted Nov. 7,
1990). See also Tuna Panel Report, supra note 59, at 1620.
74. Canada. Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, GATT Doc. L/6268, BISD 35th Supp. 98, (1989) (GATT panel report
adopted Mar. 22, 1988).
75. The Salmon/Herring panel interpreted "in conjunction with" as a mea-
sure which is "primarily aimed at rendering effective" the restriction. Id. at
114. This qualification is a further extension of the national treatment
principle.
76. The agreements on nontariff measures are in the following areas: anti-
dumping practices, customs valuation, government procurement, import licens-
ing, subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, trade in
civil aircraft, dairy products and meat.
77. See supra note 8. Until the Uruguay Round, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures were included in the standards code. It appears that these will be-
come a separate code when the Uruguay round is completed. See infra note 87
and accompanying text.
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tion basis. Signatories are encouraged to accept test results,
certificates, or marks of conformity issued in the country of
export when they are satisfied that such testing and certifica-
tion is performed by a competent body using appropriate
methods.7
* Open procedures must be followed whenever a new or revised
standard or technical regulation is being drafted, or a new cer-
tification system is to be introduced, unless international stan-
dards are used.79
" Whenever possible, standards are to be specified in terms of
performance rather than design or descriptive
characteristics.8 0
" Signatories are encouraged to use international standards.8 '
* Information on standards and certification systems is to be
made readily available to the public. Signatories must publish
information, establish inquiry points, and submit notifications
to the GATT.8 2
* Upon request, signatories must provide technical assistance to
developing countries on mutually agreed terms and
conditions.8 3
" Signatories have rights to consult and submit disputes to the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, which can appoint
a working group of technical experts,84 a panel of trade policy
experts or both.a5 Any action must be authorized by the Com-
mittee and is limited to withdrawal of benefits contained in
the code.s6 While there have been consultations, there has
been no final formal resolution of a dispute since the code
came into force.
The current Uruguay Round negotiations seek to (a) ex-
pand disciplines to cover conformity assessment procedures; (b)
cover processes and production methods; (c) cover non-govern-
mental regional standards development; and (d) improve trans-
parency and dispute settlement procedures. At this stage, it
appears that the Standards Code will no longer cover sanitary
78. Standards Code, supra note 52, art. 2, para. 2.
79. 1&
80. IMi art. 2, para. 4.
81. 1& at pmbl.
82. Id art. 11, para. 2.
83. 1I art. 11.
84. Id. art. 14, paras. 9-13.
85. Id art. 14, paras. 14-18.
86. Id art. 14, paras. 19-22.
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and phytosanitary measures in light of provisions under discus-
sion and negotiation in the agriculture negotiations.
C. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES
In early 1988, a separate working group was established as
part of the agriculture negotiations to discuss sanitary and
phytosanitary (S&P) regulations and barriers. The current
draft agreement obligates countries to ensure that health-re-
lated agricultural regulations which affect trade are consistent
with sound science.8 7 It also provides a mechanism for distin-
guishing between those sanitary and phytosanitary measures
that legitimately protect health and safety and those that are
disguised barriers to trade. The text creates incentives to utilize
international standards while recognizing that more strict do-
mestic standards may be necessary. In cases where more strict
standards are applied, they must be scientifically based. Also,
standards differing from international measures must be the
least trade-restrictive measure necessary to achieve the chosen
level of health protection.
VII. IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT POLICIES
There is a clear need for taking steps to improve the man-
agement of trade and environment policy. One of the issues that
will have to be addressed is what institutional improvements
could be made in GATT and in various environmental fora to
assure a better flow of information and the establishment of a
more collaborative process between the GATT and environmen-
tal organizations. Consideration will also have to be given to the
possible elaboration, interpretation or amendment of existing
GATT rules to assure environmental considerations are appro-
priately reflected in trade decisions involving environmental is-
sues. In turn, reforms of GATT rules should help assure that all
trade measures taken for environmental reasons agree with ex-
isting disciplines which protect the integrity of the trading
system.
There is wide agreement among GATT members that the
GATT's trade rules need to be adapted to better support the
achievement of environmental goals at both the national and
87. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, L (1-74), Dec. 20, 1990 (Dunkel
Draft) (Agriculture Measures).
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global level.88 As a reflection of that consensus, a GATT work-
ing party on the environment that has long lain dormant has
been revived, and has already examined the use of trade meas-
ures for environmental purposes in some detail.8 9 Forging a con-
sensus on how the existing rules might be interpreted or
amended, nevertheless will be difficult, and is likely to take
some time. Some have called for the launching of a Green
Round following the completion of the Uruguay Round to re-
solve these issues.
Other efforts are under way in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to establish a bet-
ter understanding of the relationship between trade and
environmental policies. In recognition of the urgency of this is-
sue, OECD Ministers, in their May 1992 Communique called, for
the development of guidelines for managing the relationship be-
tween trade and environment as soon as possible.9°
To pursue the work in this area, the OECD Trade Commit-
tee and the OECD Environment Committee have established a
joint working party and work program. Work is well under way
on the analysis of the effects of environmental policies on trade,
the effects of trade policies on the environment, the compatibil-
ity of national environment policies, the applicability of existing
GATT and OECD principles to trade-related environment is-
sues, and developing country concerns. The working party has
also begun to examine a list of key issues, including the use of
trade measures to achieve environmental objectives, trade provi-
sions in international environmental agreements, convergence/
harmonization of environmental policies and instruments, envi-
ronmental provisions in trade policies and agreements, and pro-
cedural and institutional issues with regard to trade and
environment.
In laying the groundwork for future guidelines on trade and
environment, the joint working party is analyzing the relevance
and applicability of a number of basic trade and environment
principles and concepts. In addition to the general principle of
maintaining a global focus on preservation of environmental re-
sources, the principles and concepts being examined include:
88. Trade-Environment Debate Narrows Down Differences, 82 GATT Fo-
cus, July 1991, at 1-2.
89. Id
90. Organization for Cooperation and Development, Communique of the
Ministerial Meeting, May 19, 1992 [hereinafter 1992 Ministerial Meeting] (on
file with author).
[Vol. 2:171
THE LINK BETWEEN TRADE & ENVIRONMENT
" national treatment,91
" nondiscrimination, which holds that different foreign prod-
ucts or producers should be treated the same,
* transparency, which holds that there should be full public dis-
closure of rules and regulations,
" proportionality, which holds that the trade impact and cost of
a measure should bear a reasonable relationship to the impor-
tance of the social objective it is designed to achieve, and
should not be more trade-distortive than necessary to achieve
the desired trade objective,
* legitimacy, which holds that measures should be based on sci-
entific evidence regarding the potentially adverse conse-
quences of a regulated activity and those potentially adverse
consequences should be widely recognized as legitimate con-
cerns of government,
* polluter/user pays principle, which holds that the producer
and the final consumer of a product or service should pay for
the cost of reducing the pollution associated with the produc-
tion of that good or service to socially acceptable levels,
* sustainable development, 2
* precautionary principle,9 3
" life-cycle concept, which holds that environmental considera-
tions should reflect the environmental impact of production,
use and disposal of a product,94 and
* preservation of global environmental resources.
The discussions in' the joint working party have revealed
considerable language barriers between the trade and environ-
mental communities, because terms such as transparency, non-
discrimination or legitimacy often have very different meanings
in the two communities. 95 The joint working party and the two
parent committees are therefore considering how the develop-
91. See supra note 11.
92. See supra notes 22-24.
93. See supra note 26.
94. See supra note 25.
95. Some examples of this misunderstanding include: transparency in the
trade context means a regulation has been published in order to facilitate com-
pliance by trading partners. In the environmental context, transparency means
that a regulation has no substantial impact on an environmental agreement.
Nondiscrimination in the trade context implies that a regulation does not vio-
late the MFN principle or the national treatment obligation. In the environ-
mental context, it means a trade regulation or measure does not discriminate
among environmental alternatives. A legitimate trade regulation accomplishes
a laudable trade goal, i.e. it is not a disguised protectionist barrier. A legitimate
environmental regulation simply preserves and protects the environment, re-
gardless of its impact on other producers or industries.
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ment of guidelines might serve the function of defining key
trade policy principles in terms of language that would be clear
to environmental officials, and how environmental concepts
could be defined so they could be given concrete meaning in
trade policy terms. Short of a revision of GATT rules, the devel-
opment of such guidelines as tools for decision-makers could go
a long way towards establishing improved communications be-
tween the two policy communities and defusing potential
conflicts.
As a first step toward ensuring the mutual consideration of
trade and environmental issues, the joint working party decided
earlier this year to draft a set of common procedural principles
that would be designed to assure better communication between
trade and environmental officials and more collaborative ap-
proaches to decision-making. Such procedural guidelines were
incorporated in a joint report by the Trade Committee and the
Environmental Policy Committee to OECD Ministers in June
1993,96 and were approved by the Ministers at their annual meet-
ing on June 3, 1993. 97
The procedural guidelines by the OECD covered (a) trans-
parency and consultation, (b) trade and environmental examina-
tions, reviews, and follow up, (c) international environmental
cooperation, and (d) dispute settlement.98 In each of these four
areas the text proposes a general guideline, an explanation of
the rationale for the guideline and a more extensive elaboration
of the application of the guideline. The four general procedural
guidelines and the subjects covered by the further elaboration of
each guideline are as follows:
1. "Transparency and Consultation. Governments should
provide for transparency and for consultation with interested
parties in the development of trade and environmental policies
with potentially significant effects on each other." The further
elaboration addresses in greater detail (a) transparency at the
inter-governmental level, (b) government policy-making, (c)
consultation with non-governmental interested parties, and (d)
availability of information.
96. Organization for Cooperation and Development, Joint Report of the
Trade Committee and Environment Policy Committee, June 3, 1993 [hereinaf-
ter Joint Report] (on file with author).
97. Organization for Cooperation and Development, Communique of the
Ministerial Meeting, June 3, 1993 [hereinafter 1993 Ministerial Meeting] (on file
with author).
98. Joint Report, supra note 96.
99. Id.
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2. "Trade and Environmental Examinations, Reviews,
and Follow-Up. Governments should examine or review trade
and environmental policies and agreements with potentially sig-
nificant effects on the other policy area early in their develop-
ment to assess the implication for the other policy area and to
identify alternative policy options for addressing concerns. Gov-
ernments may co-operate in undertaking such examinations and
reviews. Governments should follow-up as appropriate to imple-
ment policy options; to re-examine the policies, agreements and
any measures in place; and to address any concerns identified in
the conclusion of such re-examinations."'1 ° The further elabo-
rations discuss the methodologies for the conduct of examina-
tions or reviews, the type of actions that might be appropriate to
address concerns identified in a review or examination, and fol-
low-up activities.
3. "International Environmental Co-Operation. Govern-
ments should co-operate to address transboundary, regional, and
global environmental concerns, in particular through the negoti-
ation and implementation of environmental policies and agree-
ments among the countries concerned, with a view to enhancing
the effectiveness of environmental action and avoiding undue ef-
fects on trade."' 0' The further elaboration goes into greater de-
tail on the desirability of multilateral co-operation in dealing
with transboundary and global environmental problems.
4. "Dispute Settlement. When, pursuant to an agreement
between countries, a country is a party to a trade dispute which
has an environmental dimension, or to an environmental dispute
which has a trade dimension, the government, in developing its
national approach, should recognize the importance of taking
into account as appropriate, environmental, trade, scientific, and
other relevant expertise and should therefore work further to
develop, as necessary, appropriate means to assure trans-
parency."'102 The further elaboration addresses the participation
of government officials from the related policy area as well as
from non-governmental organizations, and commits govern-
ments to the future development of appropriate provisions for
greater transparency in dispute settlement provisions included
in trade and environmental agreements.
These procedural guidelines establish the most concrete





MINN J. GLOBAL TRADE
share information and to work with each other in managing
overlapping issues. The most significant elements are the com-
mitment by trade officials to review the environmental impact
of trade decisions and the corresponding commitment by envi-
ronmental officials to review the trade impact of environmental
policy decisions. The most sensitive issue covered is the provi-
sion for greater transparency and participation in dispute settle-
ment procedures. In this area, the guidelines represent an
important step forward in as much as it encourages each govern-
ment to provide for greater transparency and participation in
the preparation of national positions in dispute settlement cases,
but falls short of a commitment to open up the multilateral dis-
pute settlement procedures.
Ministers urge the Trade Committee and the Environment
Policy Committee to continue their work "with a view to devel-
oping appropriate substantive guidelines as well as providing in-
put to negotiating rules in the relevant multilateral fora.' l03 In
their joint report to Ministers, the two committees indicated
that they expected to concentrate their work on the following
issues: (a) Methodologies for conducting examinations, reviews,
and follow-up of trade and environmental policies and agree-
ment; (b) effects of trade liberalization on the environment; (c)
processes and production methods (PPMs); (d) use of trade
measures for environmental purposes; (e) the concept of life-cy-
cle management and trade; (f) harmonization of environmental
standards; (g) trade and environmental principles and concepts;
(h) economic instruments, environmental subsidies and trade;
(i) environmental policies, investment and trade; and (i) dispute
settlement.104
CONCLUSION
The stage is set for an improved dialogue between the trade
policy community and the environmental policy community. Es-
tablishing close cooperation, nevertheless, remains a major chal-
lenge because the two policy communities have very different
cultures and operating styles. However difficult the challenge, it
must be faced, because neither policy community will be able to
achieve its objectives in the future without developing a com-
mon language and mutually acceptable concepts, principles and
rules to guide overlapping policy decisions.
103. 1993 Ministerial Meeting, supra note 97.
104. Joint Report, supra note 96.
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While there are a number of issues that must be resolved,
the key issue concerns the appropriate use of trade measures to
achieve extraterritorial environmental objectives. The trade
policy community must ultimately accept, the notion that there
are circumstances where that may be appropriate because ac-
tions that harm the environment abroad can also hurt the envi-
ronment at home. The environmental community, on the other
hand, must accept the notion that trade measures cannot resolve
fundamental disagreements among countries over appropriate
environmental goals and measures. A country ultimately can-
not sustain an exclusive right to determine its own environmen-
tal policies, and at the same time insist on a right to impose its
own views upon others.

